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Abstract 
There has been a recent resurgence in debate about methods for statistical inference in 
science. The debate addresses statistical concepts and their impact on the value and 
meaning of analyses' outcomes. In contrast, philosophical underpinnings of approaches and 
the extent to which analytical tools match philosophical goals of the scientific method have 
received less attention. This short piece considers application of the scientific method to 
‘what-is-the-influence-of x-on-y’ type questions characteristic of sport and exercise science. 
We consider applications and interpretations of estimation versus falsification based 
statistical approaches and their value in addressing how much x influences y, and in 
measurement error and method agreement settings. We compare estimation using 
magnitude based inference (MBI) with falsification using null hypothesis significance testing 
(NHST), and highlight the limited value both of falsification and NHST to address problems in 
sport and exercise science. We recommend adopting an estimation approach, expressing 
the uncertainty of effects of x on y, and their practical/clinical value against pre-determined 
effect magnitudes using MBI.  
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Since the times of William Sealey Gosset (1876-1937) and Ronald Aylmer Fisher (1890-1962), 
there has been debate about approaches to statistical inference.  In the last three decades, 
debate has undergone a resurgence with emphasis on shortcomings of conventional null 
hypothesis significance testing (NHST) (Cohen, 1994; Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016) and 
implications for sport, exercise and medicine research (Hopkins et al., 2009; Wilkinson, 
2014). Arguments have largely been about statistical concepts and how they impact on the 
meaning and value of outcomes of analyses. An aspect of the debate that has received less 
attention is the philosophical underpinning of approaches discussed and how well these 
tools match the application of the scientific method to the types of problem characteristic of 
sport and exercise science. In this short piece, we consider the scientific method, the types 
of research question commonly addressed, and applications and interpretations of 
outcomes of statistical analyses that might best match the questions we ask.  
The scientific method, falsification and NHST 
Science is a systematic process of addressing questions, characterised by inductive reasoning 
from observations in experiments, to general theories that attempt to explain observations 
and predict future events. According to philosopher Karl Popper (1934, 1969), the value of 
such theories lies in their ability to generate specific predictions (hypotheses) that can be 
compared against experimental results and, potentially, be shown to be wrong. Popper 
suggested that specific predictions at odds with experimental data falsify the prediction in a 
pass-fail manner, and should lead to amendment or abandonment of the parent theory. It is 
through such amendments or abandonment of theories by falsification that, Popper 
claimed, science and knowledge advanced. He further wrote that theories unable to 
generate potentially falsifiable and specific predictions, were not scientific (Popper, 1934). 
The attempted falsification of hypotheses by experiment has been suggested to be an ‘ideal’ 
application of the scientific method (Ladyman, 2002). It also seems to support the statistical 
approach of NHST whereby researchers strive to falsify their null hypothesis in a pass-fail 
manner.   
Criticisms of the falsification approach 
As a theory, Popper’s thesis must itself be subject to falsification. In his classic text ‘The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ (1962), Thomas Kuhn systematically dismantled Popper’s 
thesis using a detailed historical account of scientific progress in disciplines including physics 
and astronomy. The ‘paradigm shifts’ Kuhn described were completely at odds with the 
incremental progress suggested by Popper. Moreover, Kuhn found no evidence that theories 
are simply abandoned, as Popper suggested, in the face of a falsifying observation or an 
accumulation thereof.  The dichotomous decision accompanying falsification is mirrored by, 
and has been widely criticised in, NHST (Cohen, 1994; Batterham and Hopkins, 2006; Ziliak 
and McCloskey, 2008). Perhaps it is time to consider a philosophical approach that improves 
standard scientific practice, and a statistical approach that does likewise. 
Research questions in sport and exercise science 
Most, if not all research questions in sport and exercise science take the form ‘does x 
predict/correlate with y, or what is the effect of x on y? In fact, both can be expressed simply 
as ‘does x influence y’? This can be addressed with a yes/no approach (NHST) or with a 'how 
much?’ approach (interval estimation). The former requires a specific threshold and 
definition of what ‘yes’ and ‘no’ mean. This should be an effect magnitude of 
practical/clinical value if NHST is performed correctly. Such effect magnitudes are rarely 
stated in studies using NHST. Instead, an arbitrarily chosen threshold of P < 0.05, is 
considered the pass-fail criterion, where P is the probability of an effect magnitude as big or 
bigger than that observed occurring in the long run, if the true population effect size were 
zero. This process leads to decisions with high error rates (Colquhoun, 2014; Hopkins and 
Batterham, 2016) and without practical or clinical context (Batterham and Hopkins, 2006). 
Even if a threshold with real-world context is specified, the uncertainty of observed/sample 
effect sizes (because say, of sampling error) cloud a simple dichotomous decision about the 
‘true’ population effect. The value of any philosophical and statistical approach with an 
absolute dichotomous outcome is therefore questionable.  
These problems are negated by an estimation/how much? approach to science and 
statistical analysis. Specific and absolute predictions/thresholds of effect or are not required 
here. All that is needed is a sense of effect magnitude that is of practical/clinical importance. 
The researcher simply sets out to estimate the magnitude of the influence of x on y, 
expressing the uncertainty around the estimate with a confidence interval, and interpreting 
the interval in the context of a practically/clinically worthwhile effect. This approach is 
simple, informative, less prone to error (Hopkins and Batterham, 2016) and improves 
research activity in sport and exercise science. It is encapsulated by MBI. 
Measurement error and/or method agreement studies present another problem for the 
falsification approach and accompanying NHST. Such studies are crucial to rigorous 
measurement and interpretation of interventions, but the goal is simply to estimate 
variability between repeated measurements under standard conditions with the same tool, 
or between different measurement tools. This variability is not known before a study. A 
predicted falsifiable outcome and pass-fail approach is therefore unhelpful in these settings. 
An estimation approach however, is well suited to the philosophical and analysis goals. 
In summary, Popper’s falsification thesis and the NHST approach (believed by many to 
embrace falsification), are of limited value for tackling questions characteristic of sport and 
exercise science.  Some of these issues have been addressed in editorials in this Journal 
(Winter, 2008; Winter et al., 2014) and in detail elsewhere (Batterham and Hopkins, 2006). 
The philosophical goals of sport and exercise science are better served by an estimation 
approach and statistical methods that embody this, namely MBI.  
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